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INTRODUCTION 
The last few decades have witnessed an explosion of research on corporate governance from 
a wide array of academic fields including finance, accounting, management, economics and 
sociology (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Aguilera, Desender, Bednar, & Lee, 2015; Filatotchev 
& Boyd, 2009). This rising academic interest in corporate governance has been in part 
triggered by corporate scandals, public outcry on lavish executive compensation (Dorff, 
2014), and perceived irresponsibility of some big banks and corporations in recent years. 
Nonetheless, there are some enduring reasons why corporate governance has attracted 
substantial interests in diverse academic fields. Corporate governance plays a fundamental 
role in allocating resources and responsibilities within and across firms, thereby affecting 
strategic choices as well as value creation and distribution within individual organizations, 
alliances, and even across countries. As such, understanding the behavioral and strategic 
choices and the ultimate performance of organizations, alliances, and countries requires an 
intimate knowledge of involved governance dimensions.  
Moreover, corporate governance is socially constructed in terms of how it is 
perceived and legitimately accepted, which in turn reflects and influences the institutional 
logics1 embedded in corporate goals and controls (Aguilera, Desender, Bednar, & Lee, 
2015). As these norms and believes of what it is the acceptable corporate behavior often 
differ widely across industries, countries, and regions, and they tend to evolve over time, so 
do the notion and practices of corporate governance. Thus, the study of norms and practices 
on corporate governance at a given period of time in a country often entails more than 
addressing questions on corporate governances from purely economic and legal perspectives, 
and necessitates instead a broader attention to societal norms, cultural attributes, and ethical 
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values.   
 Despite the complexity of issues around corporate governance, a disproportionate 
share of prior work has been conceptualized and guided by agency theory (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). Since the seminal publication by Berle and Means (1932) recognizing the alienation of 
ownership from control and its concomitant agency conflicts, a great number of studies in the 
tradition of agency theory have focused on designing governance mechanisms necessary to 
prevent the manifestation of agency conflicts and to ensure that the firm operates in the best 
interests of shareholders. However, the validity of some of their findings and subsequent 
recommendations have been challenged since assumptions and theoretical foundations 
underlying agency theory may be too narrow or even invalid (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; 
Davis, Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005; Schoorman & Donaldson, 2007). 
More recent work has sought to relax the assumptions behind agency theory in order 
to enrich our understanding of corporate governance, particularly as we expand outside the 
premises of the shareholder value maximization governance model which has characterized 
the Anglo-Saxon world. We discuss three fruitful implications of the relaxation of agency 
assumptions. First, early work on agency theory tends to assume away the significance of 
identities of owners, relying on ownership concentration as an indicator of agency conflicts or 
of monitoring effectiveness. However, research on the relationship between ownership 
concentration and performance fails to produce consistent findings (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & 
Roengpitya, 2003). Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) emphasize the potential conflicts 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.  
Studies in management also develop this idea of “conflicting voices” and “principal-
principal conflicts” to recognize that different owners may have different preferences and 
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time horizons, and that there may even be conflicts of interests among different owners 
(Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 2010; Desender, Aguilera, Crespi-Cladera,& Garcia-
Cestona, 2013; Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Hautz, Mayer, & Stadler, 2013; 
Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Gruton, & Jiang, 
2008; Zheng, 2010). Different owners may even be attracted to different firms depending 
upon value orientation such as prosocial orientation (Zeitoun & Pamini, 2015). This tension 
gets even more pronounced when the owners are from different countries and in turn 
equipped with distinct shareholder activism practices as Japanese firms experienced during 
the raise of hedge fund activism post Asian crises (Buchanan, Chai, & Deakin, 2014). As a 
consequence, a richer examination of heterogeneity among owners is necessary for designing 
and implementing effective governance practices.  
In this vein, three articles in this special issue provide focused reviews on specific 
types of owners. First, Grosman, Okhmatovskiy, and Wright (2016) study an idiosyncratic yet 
not homogeneous type of owner, the state. They show through an implicit comparison of 
China and Russia that national political and strategic interests are highly embedded in the 
firms’ governance strategies as well as the type of state capitalism that these countries pursue. 
Second, McNulty and Nordberg (2016) examine different modes of shareholder engagement 
on what they refer to “active ownership.” Specifically, they develop a process model of 
institutional investors’ engagement and mutual exchange with managers and other owners, 
taking a longer-term perspective towards investment in the firm and its affairs. These authors 
show that psychological ownership is an important dimension to capture who owners are and 
to define how owners and managers relate to each other. Finally, the type of owners will 
certainly determine the type of board as well as these boards’ diversity. This is a missing link 
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that the article by Gabaldon, de Anca, Mateos, and Gimeno (2016) is seeking to establish 
when presenting a systematic discussion of the supply-side and demand-side barriers as well 
as the mechanisms to overcome these barriers in the under-representation of women in 
boards.  
 Second, agency theory maintains that shareholders, not other stakeholders, are 
residual claimants in the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Residual claimants are supposed to 
bear residual risks and take all the residual profits left over after the firm satisfies its legal 
obligations to stakeholders (e.g., interests to creditors, wages to employees, taxes to the 
state). If, indeed, shareholders are the only residual claimants in the firm, the efforts of 
maximizing shareholder wealth would enhance firm performance and improve social welfare 
as well. However, a series of scholars examining the breath of stakeholders in more detail 
(Blair, 1995; Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2014; Stout, 2012; Zeitoun & Pamini, 2015, just to 
cite a few) argue that stakeholders like employees often make substantial firm-specific 
investments and bear residual risks as well in the case of insolvency or layoffs. In this case, 
the efforts of maximizing shareholder wealth alone may distort resource allocation within and 
across firms, generating unintended consequences at the societal level. Zattoni (2011) 
introduces a contingency model where he proposes an alignment between stakeholder 
contributions and ownership rights.  
For instance, the article by Srivastav and Hagendorff (2016) in this special issue 
points out the problems of viewing shareholders of banks as the only residual claimants and 
taking shareholder-focused approach in the banking industry. Since banks are highly 
leveraged, and their liabilities are often guaranteed by the state (or taxpayers), shareholder-
focused governance may well subordinate the interests of other stakeholders and exacerbate 
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risk-taking concerns in the banking industry (Srivastav & Hagendorff, 2016). Zalewska 
(2016) shares similar concerns when she states that structuring bankers’ remuneration to 
maximize shareholder value does not necessarily reduce the systemic risk of the banking 
sector. Thus, designing and implementing governance mechanisms may entail an assessment 
of incentives and disincentives faced by all the stakeholders that potentially contribute to firm 
performance. On a broader level, an increasing interest in corporate social responsibility 
might also reflect the growing recognition of the significance of stakeholder engagement 
(Bundy, Shropshire, & Buchholtz, 2013). Some firms are more social responsible than others, 
and part of it is determined by their ownership incentives and interests (Rees & Rodionova, 
2015); whether and how important the consideration for social responsibility is in resource 
allocation and decision making are influenced by corporate governance design, as 
summarized in the article by Jain and Jamali (2016) in this special issue.  
Third, agency theory overlooks as to how institutional environments shape the degree 
and nature of agency conflicts and the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Tihanyi, Graffin, & Geoge, 2014). Since most previous research 
has focused on U.S. firms, institutional environments might be neglected in theorizing. 
However, recent work clearly demonstrates that there are substantial variations in 
institutional environments along dimensions such as investor protection, creditor rights, 
employee voice, disclosure levels around the globe, just to cite a few. It is also shown that 
these institutional variations play a critical role in explaining cross-national differences in 
corporate governance mechanisms accordingly (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
2006; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Adams, Licht, & Sagiv, 2011; 
Hooghiemstra, Hermes, & Emanuels, 2015). For instance, a recent stream of research has 
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addressed corporate governance in emerging economies such as China or India, whose 
institutional environments are less developed or quite different from those of advanced 
economies (Chen, Liu, & Lin, 2015; Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012; Lattemann, Fetscherin, 
Alon, Li, & Schneider, 2009; Li, 2013; Singh & Gaur, 2009; Zhang, Gao, Guan, & Jiang, 
2014; Zhang, Chen & Feng, 2014; Nagar and Sen, 2015). Business groups are claimed to be 
an organizational form to overcome market imperfections prevalent in emerging economies 
(Colpan, Hikino, & Lincoln, 2010; Khanna & Palepu, 2010). They exhibit unique governance 
challenges as well as attributes to overcome broader strategic issues such as institutional 
voids or competitiveness as summarized by Colli and Colpan’s (2016) article in this special 
issue. In addition, institutional elements in a country tend to complement each other, giving 
rise to the varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2002), and national business systems 
(Whitley, 1999).  
In recent years, an increasing number of studies have come to take national 
institutional environments more seriously. A promising yet underdeveloped body of literature 
takes a comparative approach to highlight cross-national institutional differences and their 
implications on corporate governance and performance (Schiehll, Ahmadjian, & Filatotchev, 
2014). Indeed, the review article by Schiehll and Martins (2016) in this special issue compiles 
the evidence that national institutional environments not only affect the firm-level choice of 
governance mechanisms, but they also interact with firm-level governance mechanisms to 
influence firm performance. Similarly, one of the most well-researched cross-national 
governance dimensions has been the rule of law and in particular, minority shareholder rights. 
Cuomo, Mallin, and Zattoni’s (2016) article in this special issue shed further light on this 
research by discussing the co-existence of some very successful soft law “comply or explain” 
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codes of good governance with hard law regulation, as well as the emergence of more 
normatively effective transnational governance.  
 
SYNOPSES OF INCLUDED ARTICLES 
Drawing upon the 89 empirical studies published in the fields of accounting, finance, 
and management between 2003 and 2014, Schiehll and Martins (2016) develops in this 
special issue a systematic literature review on cross-national comparative studies. In these 
studies, they find the “substantial variation in the use and measurement of country-level 
factors as well as a variety of causal forms used to explain the combined effects of country- 
and firm-level governance mechanisms.” To appraise and synthesize these cross-national 
comparative studies, the authors first classifie them into two categories: the ones exploring 
how country-level governance factors influence firm-level governance mechanisms and the 
ones exploring how country-level and firm-level governance mechanisms are combined to 
influence firm performance. Then, they compile the findings of these studies by causal model 
forms: additive, intervening variable, independent variable interaction, and moderator 
variable interaction. In doing so, their article represents an excellent review of the current 
literature, pointing out future research opportunities. 
Grosman, Okhmatovskiy, and Wright (2016) review the extant interdisciplinary 
literature on state control and corporate governance in transition economies since the fall of 
the Berlin Wall. They discuss how state control has evolved as countries transition from 
centrally-planned to market based economies and how in turn firms’ corporate governance 
adjusts to these significant changes in not only ownership but also logics. The article sheds 
light on the wide range of forms of state control beyond direct majority ownership which has 
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important consequences for governance. Their study focuses mostly in China and Russia and 
there is an implicit comparison of state-controlled firms across these two transition 
economics. They conclude with a set of research questions by inviting scholars to explore 
more deeply the means of state control, their associated corporate governance structures and 
processes, and of course urge not to neglect the institutional context in which these 
relationships take place. 
Cuomo, Mallin, and Zattoni (2016) revisit the classic topic of codes of good 
governance in light of the 2008 global financial crises as well as related corporate governance 
scandals which question the effectiveness of soft law governance mechanisms such as codes 
as well as the overall governance regulation. They begin the article with a renewed definition 
of codes of good governance as well as an assessment of their diffusion around the world. 
Then, they turn to a systematic review of research on codes of good governance where they 
distinguish between country-level and firm-level studies on codes. Throughout their article, 
the question of compliance and enforcement emerges as a driving force for change. 
Moreover, these authors pay particular attention to the challenges of the co-existence of hard 
and soft law as well as the increasing salience of transnational codes of good governance 
such as the OECD code. 
Aktas, Croci and Simsir (2016) focus on the well-developed and growing strand of 
the literature that links corporate governance with takeover outcomes. By adopting an agency 
perspective and reviewing both empirical and theoretical research, they provide useful 
insights for the design of effective governance mechanisms that can improve the efficiency of 
the takeover market. In particular, the governance mechanisms considered include the board 
of directors and executive compensation, the takeover market and pressure from financial 
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market participants, product market competition and the labor market. Their findings 
demonstrate the important role of both internal and external governance in improving 
takeover outcomes. They conclude by offering important avenues for future research such as 
the study of the long-term effects of takeovers on firm’s financial performance and the use of 
quasi-natural experiments to deal with the endogeneity issue.   
Taking a broader perspective on corporate governance as the “structure of rights and 
responsibilities among the parties with a stake in the firm” and focusing on the 
“organizational processes through which different CG [corporate governance] mechanisms 
interact and affect corporate financial and social outcomes,” Jain and Jamali (2016) in the 
special issue provide a systematic overview of work on the relationships between corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility. They examine 94 peer-reviewed journal 
articles published between 2000 and 2015, categorize their findings by the level of corporate 
governance variables: formal and informal institutions at the institutional level, ownership 
structure and identities of owners at the firm level, board structure, and director social capital 
and resource network at the group level, and CEO’s demographics and socio-psychological 
characteristics at the individual level. Their article offers an excellent summary of the current 
literature, concluding by offering future research directions.  
Colli and Colpan (2016) engage in an extensive review of a massive yet “siloed” (or 
segmented) literature on business groups. Their goal is to dissect from this large body of 
research what have we learned on how business groups design their corporate governance. 
After a brief discussion on how governance fits within the study of different types of business 
groups as well as highlighting the main theoretical approaches that have been used to tackle 
this complex issue, they propose an organizing framework (see their Figure 1) in which they 
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categorize research addressing governance issues in business groups published in a wide 
array of disciplines: business, management, finance as well as business history journals. Their 
organizing framework allows them to pursue an insightful examination of research on: (1) the 
nature of the ownership in business groups, (2) intra-group mechanisms for control and 
coordination, (3) the relationship between the two; and (4) a deep exploration of 
organizational and performance outcomes. Colli and Colpan (2016) conclude their article by 
proposing “four high priority avenues” of future research which include specific and fruitful 
recommendations on where to take future research of business groups next.   
John, De Masi and Paci (2016) review the literature on the governance of banks. 
They firstly discuss several unique features of the banking industry, such as restrictive 
regulation, increased reliance on debt and complexity of operations, which have important 
implications for bank governance. A novelty of their survey is that it evaluates bank 
governance by taking into account the objectives of depositors and the society-at-large, in 
addition to those of bank shareholders. The second part of their study focuses on the 
effectiveness of several governance mechanisms available to banks (e.g. board structure and 
quality, ownership structure, incentives) in a cross-country context. Their findings suggest 
that a multiple stakeholder perspective is required to fully understand what constitutes good 
governance for banks. 
Zalewska (2016) provides a comprehensive review of the literature on the regulation 
of bankers’ remuneration. Similar to John, De Masi and Paci (2016), the first part of her study 
focuses on the “specialness” of banks, which arises from the riskiness of their assets, their 
interconnectivity and their systemic importance to the economy. Such features necessitate a 
unique regulatory treatment of banker’s remuneration that goes beyond merely resolving the 
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“traditional” principal-agent conflict. The second part of her study discusses the literature on 
regulation of bankers’ remuneration and the current state of regulatory developments in the 
area. The study concludes that a new theoretical framework is required to address the failure 
of existing theories of corporate governance for setting goals and performance metrics for the 
banking industry. A second important conclusion of Zalewska’s study is that regulators 
should be involved in setting remuneration structures. However, it is by no means certain that 
overzealous regulatory reforms in banker’s remuneration, especially those ignoring the 
complexity of the banking sector, will be effective in strengthening the banking industry.  
Srivastav and Hagendorff (2016) also focus on banks and review the extant literature 
on corporate governance and bank risk taking. Their survey provides useful insights into how 
the effectiveness of bank boards, the structure of CEO compensation, and the risk 
management systems of banks can mitigate excessive risk-taking. The findings of their study 
are set against the background of several recent regulatory reforms that are driven by the need 
to protect the interests of specific groups of stakeholders. They conclude that the design of 
governance mechanisms and any regulatory reform initiatives should reflect the interests of 
bank shareholders, but also those of creditors and taxpayers. Their survey points out several 
opportunities for future research on bank risk-taking. 
McNulty and Nordberg (2016) engage in a constructive and provocative discussion 
of shareholder activism by revisiting the question of who owns the corporation and pushing 
forward the construct of “active ownership.” They define active ownership as a process of 
long term investor-firm interactions where the development of relationships is critical. The 
authors anchor their review in uncovering the interests and motivations of heterogeneous 
institutional investors in how some of them engage in various forms of “voice.” In addition to 
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the more conventional approaches to ownerships such as market and institutions, they discuss 
how active ownership also encompasses psychological ownership. Their arguments are 
presented in a comprehensive process framework which takes institutional shareholders 
through the antecedents, processes and effects leading to distinct firm outcomes.  
Stathopoulos and Voulgaris (2016) focus on Say-on-Pay, a recently developed form 
of shareholder activism that manifests itself through the expression of voice on the executive 
pay-setting process. Their study reviews and critically evaluates existing research on Say-on-
Pay and its effects on firm value and corporate decision-making. It also provides a general 
picture of the state of the shareholder activism literature, and in particular, the two main 
avenues for shareholder intervention in firm governance: “Exit” and “Voice”. Their findings 
clearly demonstrate that there is no consensus within the academic community about the 
effectiveness of Say-on-Pay as a corporate governance mechanism. Importantly, the authors 
identify conceptual gaps and empirical discrepancies in prior studies and suggest promising 
directions for future research.   
Gabaldon, de Anca, Mateos de Cabo and Gimeno (2016) develop a well-organized 
and systematic review of the extensive literature of women on boards. Once they established 
that despite recent policy and corporate efforts to break the glass ceiling, women are as not as 
present in boards as men, they discuss the supply and demand-side barriers. In particular, they 
argue that the supply-side barriers fall into three categories: gender differences in values and 
attitudes, identification with gender role expectations, and work family conflict. Regarding 
the demand-side barriers accounting for the under-representation of women in boards, they 
attribute it to gender discrimination, bias perceptions of what women might bring to the 
board, and the institutional environment. Interestingly, once they have reviewed this 
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literature, they discuss the instruments and means that could overcome or minimize these 
barriers. They conclude by proposing a set of unanswered research issues that any research on 
gender and governance should seriously consider.  
 
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Agency theory has long been the dominant theoretical lens for corporate governance 
research. However, the recent studies have pushed the field beyond the often narrow 
conceptualization of agency conflicts and corporate governance and have taken seriously the 
identities of owners, stakeholder engagement, and national institutional environments to 
address the complexity of corporate governance issues. Theoretical lens have also been 
expanded to include institutional theory, stakeholder theory, resource dependence theory, 
cognitive paradoxes, and institutional economics among others. Overall, our knowledge 
about corporate governance has been substantially improved in the last decade, some of 
which is well summarized, critiqued, and synthesized by the twelve articles in this special 
issue.  
However, we believe that there is still a lot to learn by further challenging and 
relaxing the core assumptions of agency theory. Here we introduce several new directions and 
issues to consider. First, new types of investors such as hedge funds, private equity funds, 
sovereign wealth funds, socially responsible investors, and crowdfunding have emerged and 
added to the heterogeneity of shareholders. Not only do these new types of investors 
constitute different sources of capital coupled with distinct interests, but they also provide 
different challenges on corporate governance. For instance, hedge funds in the U.S. have 
increasingly engaged in shareholder activism (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, & Thomas, 2008). Some 
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argue for hedge fund activism as benefiting shareholders; others criticize it as distracting 
executives from important projects. The deeper knowledge of hedge funds is necessary to 
understand whether and how hedge fund activism differs from activism by other institutional 
investors such as mutual funds and pension funds. The in-depth research about these 
heterogeneous owners, how they cope as co-owners, their organizational form, incentive 
structure, and monitoring capabilities should offer a fruitful avenue for future research. 
Second, future research should further disentangle the antecedents to and 
consequences of stakeholder engagement in corporate governance. The diversity in 
stakeholders seeking to influence the firm and their mechanisms has expanded in recent 
years, making it more complex and difficult to accommodate their differing interests in the 
design of corporate governance (Bundy, Shropshire, & Buchholtz, 2003). Sometimes, 
different stakeholders uphold different yet competing preferences towards the firm. For 
instance, non-family shareholders of family firms are primarily interested in obtaining 
financial gains, but family members’ interests often go beyond obtaining financial gains to 
include socio-emotional wealth or emotional and social benefits accruing from controlling the 
firm (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & Castro, 2011). Thus, the challenge that large family 
firms may face in designing corporate governance is how to balance or synthesize these 
somewhat competing demands from multiple stakeholders. It awaits the future research how 
firms recognize and address differing preferences of multiple stakeholders. 
Blair (1995: 274) defines stakeholders as all the “participants who have substantial 
firm-specific investments at risk” and recognizes employees as an important stakeholder. She 
states that “fewer and fewer publicly traded corporations actually look like the factory model. 
Much of the wealth-generating capacity of most modern firms is based on the skills and 
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knowledge of the employees and the ability of the organization as a whole to put those skills 
to work for customers and clients” (pp. 233-234). As the economy becomes more knowledge-
based, recruiting and retaining human talent presents a key challenge to the firm, generating a 
lot of academic research in the area of human resource management. However, addressing the 
issues surrounding firm-specific human capital may require to go beyond a functional view of 
human resource management to adopt the corporate governance perspective. How can the 
firm motivate employees to make a high level of firm-specific human capital? How should 
property rights be allocated between capital providers and employees? How should the firm-
specific human capital be protected ex post? Future research on these questions may generate 
new insights about the design of corporate governance of the firm where human talent is a 
more important resource than financial capital.  
Third, despite a recent increase of cross-national comparative research such as the 
cross-national study of internal control disclosures (Hooghiemstra, Hermes, & Emanuels, 
2015), there is still a lot to learn from it. In addition, multinational firms provide an excellent 
setting to address corporate governance issues in the globalized world (Starbuck, 2014; 
Tihanyi, Graffin, & Geoge, 2014) as shown by Driffield, Mickiewicz, and Temouri’s (2014) 
study of how the strength of institutions influences the division of equity shares between the 
home country and the foreign affiliates for firms from 16 eastern and central European. Given 
their presence in multiple countries, multinational firms interact with local customers, states, 
and stakeholder groups that may have different preferences and expectation across countries. 
They may have incentives to change governance mechanisms in some countries; however, 
such changes may create conflicts with governance mechanisms of the parent company or 
other national subsidiaries. Alternatively, because of their economic power, multinational 
  
17 
 
firms may influence the preferences and perceptions of local customers, shareholders, and 
stakeholder groups, thereby transplanting their own notion of corporate governance in foreign 
countries. Future research on corporate governance issues of multinational firms would 
enhance our knowledge of how the national corporate governance systems interact with the 
firm-level corporate governance and certainly move beyond agency debates into more 
institutional and resource oriented concerns.  
Fourth, agency theory and corporate governance research in general have not paid 
much attention to understanding how corporate governance affects the process of value 
creation. While addressing the “ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment,” theorizing in the tradition of agency 
theory has focused on how to ensure returning a fair share of profits to shareholders (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997: 737). However, generation of value and distribution of the generated value 
fall into inter-related yet distinctive domains. For instance, Kim and Ozdemir (2014) classify 
fiduciary roles of boards into “wealth protectors” and “wealth creators” and show how 
national institutional environments drive the choice of these two different roles of boards. 
The corporate governance designed with an emphasis on protecting shareholders’ rights as 
residual claimants may not promote risk-taking and firm-specific investments by other 
shareholders, thereby failing to realize the value-creating potential of firm resources. 
Realizing value-creating potentials in the first place might be as important as fairly 
distributing subsequent profits to involved stakeholders. However, agency theory alone might 
be quite limited in addressing how the firm generates value, knowledge, and sources of 
competitive advantage because it neglects the importance of firm-specific investments made 
by stakeholders other than shareholders (Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2014; Lazonick, 2003). 
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Entrepreneurial firms might present appropriate settings to explore the link between corporate 
governance and value creation; combining agency theory with stakeholder theory, resource-
based view and dynamic capability theory might offer fruitful lens.  
Fifth, the governance of banks, and financial institutions more generally, should also 
be analyzed within a framework that goes beyond the “traditional” principal-agent conflict. In 
particular, the “specialness” of banks, as analytically discussed by John, De Masi and Paci 
(2016), Zalewska (2016), and Srivastav and Hagendorff (2016) in this special issue, requires 
an analytical framework that does not focus exclusively on protecting the interests of equity 
claimants but also expands to incorporating non-shareholder constituencies’ interests such as 
depositors and the society-at-large. In the presence of potentially conflicting interests among 
heterogeneous constituents, the effectiveness of traditional governance mechanisms is also 
limited for the case of banks (see Leventis, Dimitropoulos, & Owusu-Ansah, 2013; Grove, 
Patelli, Victoravich, & Xu, 2011). More research is therefore warranted on the corporate 
governance of banks and, more specifically, on determining what constitutes good 
governance for financial entities. Of particular importance is to address the question of 
whether (and to what extent) bank governance contributed to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
One view is that the poor governance of banks was among the major causes of the crisis (see 
Bebchuk & Spamann, 2010; Kirkpatrick, 2009). This view is challenged, however, by recent 
research showing that banks with more independent boards, shareholder-friendly boards and 
with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed 
worse during the crisis than other banks (see Adams, 2012; Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; 
Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011). A related avenue of research is to examine whether the post-
crisis calls of regulators and policy-makers for governance reforms (see European 
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Commission, 2010; Walker, 2009; Kirkpatrick, 2009) have influenced the quality of bank 
governance. For example, there is no consensus in the literature on whether human capital 
resources at a board level (e.g. financial experience and skills) are significant predictors of 
bank risk-taking and performance. The results of recent research by Minton, Taillard, and 
Williamson (2014) and Guner, Malmendier and Tate (2008) challenge the view that more 
financial expertise on banks’ boards reduces risk-taking and improves specific corporate 
policies, such as financing, investment and compensation. Last but not least, there is scope 
for more research on the complementarity between bank-level governance and regulation. 
Survey evidence (see Laeven, 2013) and evidence from the market of corporate control (see 
Hagendorff, Collins, & Keasey, 2010) support the view that governance and regulation 
should be developed in synchrony. Yet, more systematic research is needed on whether (and 
to what extent) financial regulation can compensate for weaknesses in the internal 
governance of banks.  
Sixth, more research is warranted on the resource dependence role of corporate 
directors (see e.g. Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Haynes & 
Hillman, 2010). A significant strand of literature in corporate governance focuses on the 
impact of board capital on corporate outcomes (see e.g. Chen, 2014; De Maere, Jorissen & 
Uhlaner, 2014; Barroso, Villegas, & Pérez-Calero, 2011; Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008). 
However, the vast majority of these studies either consider the board as a collective unit or 
restrict their attention to the CEO and the Chair of the board. An interesting avenue for future 
enquiry is to look beyond the CEO and the Chair while studying how “top management 
teams” (TMTs) affect corporate governance and how boards provide resources to 
organizations. Extant research usually emphasizes the importance of the CEO and board chair 
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in the governance process yet it fails to systematically account for their interaction with the 
TMT. This is an important oversight because the role of several members of the so called “C-
suite” has been extended to make more strategic contributions. The role of the CFO, for 
example, has evolved from a financial controller to a key strategic partner to the CEO. The 
role of the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) has also grown over the years with most CROs 
currently working closely with their CEO, Chief Operations Office and other top executives 
while shaping key strategic decisions that involve risk (e.g., M&As). In addition to their 
influence on corporate strategy, a promising area of future research is to investigate whether 
the incentives, actions, behaviors, skills and other personal attributes of CFOs, CROs, COOs 
and other members of the TMT promote effective corporate governance.  
Finally, there is need for methodological advances in corporate governance research. 
For example, there is scope for more research using a mixed-methods approach. Most studies 
in corporate governance have so far focused on archival data for their empirical analyses. 
Despite their obvious attractiveness, data that are in the public domain are not well suited for 
analyzing governance attributes such as board processes, dynamics and culture. Future 
studies combining archival and data from surveys and interviews with key players (e.g. board 
members) will help to better understand the inner workings of a boardroom and draw 
inferences about how board members make their decisions.2 We also expect to see future 
research using more appropriate methods for dealing with the endogenous nature of the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm outcomes (e.g., takeover outcomes, 
dividend policy, capital structure, firm valuation). Endogeneity arises when firm and/or 
management-specific characteristics that affect an outcome variable are also correlated with 
corporate governance measures, leading to a spurious correlation between the former and the 
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latter. There are several econometric methods aimed at addressing endogeneity concerns 
including instrumental variables, difference-in-differences estimators, matching methods and 
higher order moments estimators (see Roberts & Whited, 2012 for a detailed discussion). A 
more extensive use of these methods in corporate governance research would enable a better 
understanding of the impact of corporate governance on firm outcomes.  
To conclude, there is no doubt that the field of corporate governance has been 
prolific but there is much more to learn and to draw on to better understand how the rights 
and responsibilities of different stakeholders are distributed within and outside the firm.  
 
 
NOTES 
1  The institutional logics research claims that there exists a dominant logic defined as “socially 
constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which 
[organizations] produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide 
meaning to their social reality” 
2 Recent studies that opted for a mixed-methods approach include Binacci et al. (2016), McNulty, 
Florackis and Ormrod (2013) and Du, Deloof, and Jorissen (2011). 
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